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Abstract
The Stackelberg pricing problem has two levels of decision making: tariff setting
by an operator, and then selection of the cheapest alternative by customers. In the
network version, an operator determines tariffs on a subset of the arcs that he owns.
Customers, who wish to connect two vertices with a path of a certain capacity, select
the cheapest path. The revenue for the operator is determined by the tariff and the
amount of usage of his arcs. The most natural model for the problem is a (bilinear)
bilevel program, where the upper level problem is the pricing problem of the operator,
and the lower level problem is a shortest path problem for each of the customers.
This paper contains a compilation of theoretical and algorithmic results on the
network Stackelberg pricing problem. The description of the theory and algorithms is
generally informal and intuitive. We redefine the underlying network of the problem,
to obtain a compact representation. Then we describe a basic branch-and-bound
enumeration procedure. Both concepts are used for complexity issues and for the
development of algorithms: establishing NP-hardness, approximability, special cases
solvable in polynomial time, and an efficient exact branch-and-bound algorithm.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial optimization problems on networks generally involve costs on the arcs. The
issue is to find the cheapest subset structure of the arcs such as a path, a tree, or a
matching. The decisions to be made are which arcs to include in the structure. In the
problems discussed here, also the costs (tariffs) of a given subset of the arcs are to be
determined. This introduces two levels of decisions. At the top level the tariffs of some
arcs are determined by an operator or agent, the leader. Once this is done, at the bottom
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level, customers must decide which edges they use for their optimal structure. This set-up
is a Stackelberg game. The customer’s structure here, is a path between two specified
vertices. The game for the leader is then to determine prices of the arcs controlled by
him, such that the collected revenues on the shortest paths of the customers are as high
as possible.
Applications with a natural network structure are found in different transportation sec-
tors: toll optimization on roads such as the French highway system, see (Dewez 2004;
Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998), but also the German truck toll system; long-distance
freight transportation overseas, see (Brotcorne et al. 2000), passenger transportation in
trains, and finally information transportation in telecom networks, see (Basar and Srikant 2002).
Note that an essential ingredient is that the customers must have alternatives, either the
market should be oligopolistic or there should be different alternatives, such as the choice
between cargo transportation with trains or trucks.
The problem is most naturally formulated as a bilinear bilevel program, see section 2. An
integer linear program is described in (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998). This ILP is,
however, not necessary in the description of techniques, and therefore we do not incorporate
it. The shortest path graph (SPG) is introduced in section 3. This graph, introduced in
(Bouhtou et al. 2002), reduces the size of the original network. It is also as a tool in
solution methods and complexity proofs. With the SPG, we develop a basic branch-and-
bound scheme in section 4. In section 5, we describe a series of complexity results such as
NP-hardness proofs, (in)approximability, and polynomial-time solvability. In section 6 a
series of variants and extensions is described. This section contains some interesting open
problems.
2 Problem definition and model
Consider a network represented by a directed graph G = (N, A) with nodes N and arcs
A. The arc set A is partitioned into two sets: the tariff arcs T , and the fixed cost arcs
F . The tariff arcs belong to the leader in the network and incur a tariff (to be determined
by the leader) for routing a unit of a client’s demand. The fixed arcs are owned by other
agents in the network, whose tariffs are known a priori. The tariffs on the arcs of T are
determined such that the total revenue of the leader is maximized. Both the tariffs and
the fixed costs are assumed to be nonnegative. The clients on the network route their
demands from source to destination according to the shortest path with respect to total
cost, where the total cost of a path is defined as the sum of all the tariffs and fixed costs
on the arcs of the path. Whenever the client has a choice among multiple shortest paths
with the same total cost but with different revenues for the leader, we suppose the client
takes the shortest path that is most profitable to the leader.
We denote by ca the cost of routing a unit demand on a fixed cost arc a ∈ F , and by ta
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the cost of routing a unit demand on a tariff arc a ∈ T . The commodities are denoted by
the set K. The demand of a commodity k ∈ K is given by dk. The source and destination
of commodity k are given by the pair (sk, tk). The set of paths that connect sk and tk is
given by Pk. For each path p ∈ Pk we introduce Tp for its set of tariff arcs, and Fp for its
set of fixed cost arcs. Furthermore, the cost of routing a unit demand on p is denoted by
its length lp(t), which is a function of the tariffs t. The length of p is determined by the
sum of the costs on the fixed arcs of the path, denoted by cp, and the costs on the tariff
arcs of the path, represented by πp(t). Thus, lp(t) = cp + πp(t), where cp =
∑
a∈Fp
ca, and
πp(t) =
∑
a∈Tp
ta. Note that our model implicitly incorporates arcs with both fixed and
tariff costs since we can divide such an arc a with cost ca and tariff ta into two consecutive
arcs: an arc with fixed cost ca and an arc with tariff ta.
To ensure that the problem is bounded, we assume that for each commodity there is an
upper bound on the amount the customer is willing to pay, or there exists a path from
source to destination which uses only fixed cost arcs.
The following formulation of the arc pricing problem is a direct translation of the above
description.
max
t≥0
∑
k∈K
dkπp∗
k
(t)
s.t. p∗k = arg min
p∈Pk
lp(t) ∀k ∈ K
(1)
The formulation given by (1) is a bilevel problem where at the upper level the leader strives
to maximize his revenue, while at the lower level the clients (followers) seek to minimize
the cost of routing their demands. Notice that the bilevel program given by (1) is not
polynomial in its input data, since the set of all possible paths for each client k ∈ K may
be exponential in the size of the problem instance.
Example 1 Consider the following network.
s
1 2
3 4
t
3
t1,2
7
81
t3,4
9
2
Figure 1: 1-commodity network with two tariff arcs.
3
Path Length Profit
s1234t 6 +t12 +t34 t12 +t34
s12t 9 +t12 t12
s34t 12 +t34 t34
s14t 13 0
In example 1 there are 4 paths connecting s and t. Each of these paths has a fixed
cost component and a tariff part. Though the path lengths are linear in the tariffs, the
objective is not even continuous in the tariffs. This is illustrated in the example as follows.
Let t12 = 0, and start to increase t34 from 0 to an arbitrary large value. Then up till value
3 the path s1234t is optimal, and tariff and profit are equal, and after 3 the profit drops to
0, since the path s12t becomes the most attractive path for the customer. Note that the
optimal solution for the leader is to set t12 = 3 t34 = 3, with a profit of 6 on the shortest
path s1234t per unit demand.
(Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998) considered the following arc oriented bilevel model.
Let the vector bk be the demand/supply vector for each commodity where each element of
the vector represents the demand/supply for a commodity at each node in the graph.
max
t≥0
∑
k∈K
∑
a∈T
tax
k
a
min
xk≥0
∑
k∈K
{
∑
a∈T
tax
k
a +
∑
a∈F
cax
k
a
}
s.t.
∑
a∈A+i
xka −
∑
a∈A−i
xka =



dk i = sk
−dk i = tk
0 otherwise
(2)
Here A+i is the set of arcs leaving i, and A
−
i is the set of arcs entering i. In this bilevel
model, xk ∈ R|A| represents the flow on the arcs, in vector notation of commodity k.
Furthermore, A represents the node-arc incidence matrix of the network. This model is
a bilinear bilevel program, since the upper level is linear in the tariff variables and the
lower level is linear in the arc choice variables. Clearly, the formulation is not linear in the
combination of these variables.
Formulation 2 has been used in (Brotcorne et al. 2000) and (Brotcorne et al. 2001) for the
development of primal-dual heuristics in case of a single-commodity and multiple com-
modities, respectively. (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998) developed an integer linear
programming formulation from the bilevel program as follows. The lower level problem
is a set of shortest path problems each of which can be described as the linear program
given in the lower level problem of 2. The optimal solution can now be characterized using
duality theory: add the dual and set the two objectives of dual and primal equal to one
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another. Finally, the constraints and objective contain products of tariff and design vari-
ables of the arcs. These must be linearized by introducing new variables tka a ∈ T, k ∈ K
for the products and appropriate constraints. This roughly triples the number of variables
and constraints to O(|K||T ||V |). See (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998) for a complete
description of the resulting model.
3 The Shortest Path Graph
If a client selects a shortest path, say p, then the subpaths of p are also shortest paths.
This holds specifically for the subpaths between two consecutive tariff arcs. Consider two
such arcs a1 = (i1, j1) ∈ T and a2 = (i2, j2) ∈ T . Then the subpath between j1 and i2 is a
shortest path that contains only fixed arcs.
i1 j1∈ T
i2 j2∈ T
1
2
3
4
Shortest path
∈ F
∈ F ∈ F
∈ F
∈ F
Figure 2: Shortest path of fixed cost arcs between j1 and i2.
Thus, we can restrict the client’s choice to paths p of the following structure:
p = {sp1, a1, sp2, a2, . . . , spk, ak, spk+1}, (3)
where spi, i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} are shortest subpaths using only fixed cost arcs from a tariff
arc ai to a tariff arc ai+1 on the path. Since these subpaths are part of the subgraph using
the arcs from F , their length can be computed without determining the tariffs. We can
therefore construct a new graph model, in which this is actually done: the shortest path
graph.
We will define this graph model for a single customer first. Consider the original graph
G = (N, A) with the tariff arcs in T ⊆ A. For a client with a demand d from s to t, we
define the graph G∗ = (N∗, A∗) and the tariff arcs T ∗ ⊆ A∗. In this graph, the tariff arcs
are copied from G as a matching. So, arcs with a common vertex are separated. Next, we
construct the following fixed cost arcs. For two tariff arcs a1 = (i1, j1) and a2 = (i2, j2) we
connect j1 with i2, if there is a path in G that uses fixed arcs only. Similarly, we connect
j2 with i1. From the source s we construct arcs to all the tail nodes of the tariff arcs, and
from all the head nodes we construct an arc to the destination t, again only if paths exist
5
using only fixed arcs in G. Any fixed arc in A∗ has a cost equal to the length of the shortest
path between its end vertices in G, using only fixed cost arcs in G. The new network is
the shortest path graph (SPG).
i1 j1
i2
j2
i3
j3
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
s
t
s t
i1 j1
i2 j2
i3 j3
Figure 3: Shortest path graph.
Example 2 Figure 3 shows the SPG of a network containing three tariff arcs for a cus-
tomer with demand from s to t. The tariff arcs are given by the bold arcs (i1, j1), (i2, j2)
and (i3, j3). All other arcs are representations of the shortest path using only fixed cost
arcs between each node. The cost of the arc is the cost of the corresponding shortest path
in the original network between the two nodes. The shortest path graph need not contain
all possible arcs: if there is no path between two tariff arcs, then the connecting arc is
missing in the SPG is also missing. In the example the arcs (j3, i1) and (j3, i2) are missing.
In case of multiple customers, we create an SPG for each of them. The inner graph
(consisting of the end vertices of the tariff arcs, and the arcs between them) is equal
for all customers and hence needs to be determined only once. Additional shortest path
calculations are necessary only for the arcs leaving the source and/or entering the target
of each customer. The shortest path graph model is equivalent to the original graph in
the sense that both have an optimal solution of the same value: each path in the original
graph is represented by a path in the SPG which is at least as good. Alternatively, a path
in the SPG, has exactly the same fixed costs as the shortest path in the original graph
connecting the tariff arcs of the first in the same order, and thus it contains the same tariff
arcs.
We can further reduce the SPG by removing arcs that will not be taken for any set of
tariffs. This is done by use of (path) dominance criteria. Here, nonnegativity of the tariffs
is vital.
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Definition 1 If, for any set of tariffs, the path p is at least as short as path q, then path
p dominates path q.
The following proposition allows us to eliminate dominated paths. Recall that Tp is the
set of tariff arcs from path p, and that cp is the total cost of the fixed arcs from p.
Proposition 1 Consider two paths p and q. If Tp ⊆ Tq and cq ≥ cp, then path p dominates
path q for all tariffs.
By the nonnegativity of the tariffs and Tp ⊆ Tq, the total tariff on p is at most the total
tariff on q. Since this is also the case for the total fixed costs, q will never be shorter than
p. Thus, q need never be selected by the customer.
Example 3 An instance where dominance of paths occurs is given in figure 4. The tariff
arcs are the arcs (i1, j1), and (i2, j2). The leader is dealing with one client who wants
to route his demand from node s to node t. For this graph, the path {s, i1, j1, i2, j2, t}
is dominated by the path {s, i1, j1, t}, since the arc (j1, t) has length 4 and the path
{j1, i2, j2, t} has length at least 5. In fact, the arc (j1, i2) is never used and can therefore
be removed
s t
i1 j1
i2 j2
2
4
2
4
3
10
Figure 4: Path dominance.
An arc can be removed from the network, if every path using it is dominated by a path not
using it. This may happen under various circumstances mentioned in (Bouhtou et al. 2002).
We will restrict ourselves to a few straightforward ideas.
In principal, an arc can be removed if the fixed costs to reach it from s, or to leave it to t
are large enough. Thus, in example 5, arc (i3, j3) can be removed since reaching it costs at
least 10 and leaving it costs 2. So, the fixed costs for using (i3, j3) are at least 12, which
is more than the cost of moving from s to t directly: 11. The arc (j1, i2) can be removed,
since the fixed costs of moving directly to t are 4, and leaving j1 through (j1, i2) has fixed
costs of at least 6. Similarly, arc (j2, i1) can be removed.
7
s t
i1 j1
i2 j2
i3 j3
2
1
10
2
8
4
10
2
4
2
11
s t
i1 j1
i2 j2
2
1
2
4
11
Figure 5: Arc removal.
In the SPG, the maximum number of paths for a client k ∈ K is bounded by e|T |!, the
number of ordered subsets of the tariff arcs. This number is reached in a complete SPG.
The number of undominated paths in a network is bounded by the number of possible
subsets of T , i.e. by 2|T |: If two paths p and q have an identical set of tariff arcs, then the
undominated path is the path with smallest fixed cost. Figure 6 shows that this number
of undominated paths can be reached for |T | = 4, with an easy extension to arbitrary |T |.
s 1 2 3 t
t1
1
t2
1
t3
1
t4
1
Figure 6: Network with 4 tariff arcs, and 24 undominated paths.
4 A basic Branch-and-Bound scheme
In this section we describe a branch-and-bound algorithm for the pricing problem. This
algorithm consists of two steps. In the first step we generate for each client his shortest
path graph, and we enumerate all feasible undominated paths with their fixed costs and
tariffs. In step two we solve the problem to optimality by branching and bounding on the
paths.
Denote the clients by the set K and the set of paths a client k ∈ K can take by Pk. The
reduction methods applied to the shortest path graph model allow us to determine the
set of relevant paths for each customer. We suppose that Pk is reduced to contain the
relevant paths only. Recall that the linear function lp(t) = cp + πp(t) denotes the cost of
a path p as a function of all tariff values. Let plk be the path for client k ∈ K with the
smallest fixed cost, i.e., plk = arg minp∈Pk cp and p
u
k the path with the largest fixed cost,
i.e., puk = arg maxp∈Pk cp. Note that p
u
k has no revenues for the leader, since it denotes the
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path with fixed cost arcs only. Clearly, cpu
k
− cpl
k
is an upper bound on the revenues that
can be generated from client k. This is an important measure in the branch and bound
algorithm.
4.1 Branching
In each node of the branch and bound tree, we select a client, and we create a branch for
each of the relevant paths of the client. The selection method of the clients is based on the
upper bound cpu
k
− cpl
k
on the revenue generated by each client for the leader: the client for
which this upper bound is highest, is selected first. Next, we walk through the search tree
in a depth-first manner.
4.2 Bounding
Due to our branching rules, in each node of the branch and bound tree for some clients the
path taken in the solution is fixed, whereas for other clients this choice is still to be made.
In each node, we denote by the set Kf ⊆ K the set of clients for which we have fixed the
path taken in the solution. Suppose that for any client k ∈ Kf , we have fixed the path
p∗k. We can find the optimal, revenue maximizing tariffs for the problem restricted to the
clients in Kf by solving the following linear problem.
max
∑
k∈Kf
dkπp∗
k
(t)
s.t. lp(t) ≥ lp∗
k
(t) ∀k ∈ Kf , ∀p ∈ Pk
ta ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ T
(4)
The linear program described in (4) forces the path p∗k to be the shortest path in Pk, while
maximizing the leader’s revenue.
We generate lower bounds in each node of the branch and bound tree by computing a
feasible solution. Such a feasible solution can be created by solving (4) and then adding
the revenues from the tariffs of (4) for the clients in K\Kf .
Example 4 Consider a problem with 4 customers, with demand and list of undominated
paths as follows:
d1 = 20 d2 = 10 d3 = 15 d4 = 5
1 +t1 +t2 2 +t1 +t2 3 +t1 2 +t12
3 +t2 4 +t1 5 4 +t12
5 5 +t2 7
7
9
The lower and upper bounding are as follows. Suppose that the subproblem to be solved is
the one where client 1 has the second path as shortest path (cost 3 + t2), and client 2 has
the first path as shortest path (cost 2 + t1 + t2). Then the following LP has to be solved:
max 10t1 + 30t2
s.t. 3 + t2 ≤ 1 + t1 + t2
3 + t2 ≤ 5
2 + t1 + t2 ≤ 4 + t1
2 + t1 + t2 ≤ 5 + t2
2 + t1 + t2 ≤ 7
t1, t2 ≥ 0
root
c1p1 c1p2 c1p3
c2p1 c2p2 c2p3 c2p4
Figure 7: Subproblem with LP.
Note that the subproblems define a linear program to find a lower bound (feasible solution).
In the problem above the LP generates the optimal solution t1 = 3, t2 = 2 with value 90.
The upper bound is now computed by taking the worst scenario: the gap between the fixed
costs of the best path and the fixed cost path, multiplied with the demand of each of the
remaining clients. In this case the upper bound is 15*2+5*5=55 higher than the lower
bound. Note that the lower bound is easily increased by taking the contribution of clients 3
and 4 into account. In Bouhtou et al. (Bouhtou et al. 2002) the upper and lower bounds
are strengthened furthermore.
For a client k ∈ K an upper bound for the unit demand revenue generated by that client is
given by cpu
k
− cpl
k
. As is shown by Labbé et al. (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998), this
upper bound is not necessarily reached. Even the upper bound on the cost of the path,
cpu
k
, is not tight. This is shown by the example given in figure 8. For a single client with a
unit demand from node 1 to node 4, the optimal tarification scheme is to set the tariffs on
the tariff arcs to t1 = t2 = 2. Hence, the cost of the path taken by the client is 6, yielding
a revenue of 4 for the leader. The upper bound on the cost of the path is however 7, while
the upper bound on the revenue is given by 7 − 2 = 5.
(Roch, Savard, and Marcotte 2005) give an example which shows that the relative gap can
be logarithmic in the number of tariff arcs. In other words it can be arbitrarily large.
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s 1 2 tt1 2 t2
7
4
4
Figure 8: Example where the gap can not be used completely.
5 Complexity
5.1 NP-hardness
In (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998) the version of the problem with one customer and
general (possibly negative) lower bounds on the tariffs, has been shown to be NP-hard. The
proof uses a reduction from Hamiltonian path. Later, (Roch, Savard, and Marcotte 2005)
proved that the one-customer problem is strongly NP-hard already, when all lower bounds
equal 0. They use a reduction from 3-SAT, which we give below in a slightly modified
version. Consider n variables x1, . . . , xn and m clauses C1, . . . , Cm. A clause is represented
in the tariff network with the following construct.
ui vi wi
ai1 b
i
1
ai2 b
i
2
ai3 b
i
3
1
ti
1
ti1
ti2
ti3
Figure 9: Clause Ci for three arbitrary variables.
The left three toll arcs (aij , b
i
j) (j = 1, 2, 3) with tariffs tij correspond to the three variables
in the clause. Besides the arc (vi, wi) with tariff ti, there are only fixed cost arcs, each
having fixed cost 0, except the arcs (ui, vi) and (vi, wi) with cost 1.
The clauses are coupled by identifying the nodes wi and ui+1 (i = 1, . . . , m − 1). Finally,
we add arcs with fixed cost 1
2
between any pair of tariff arcs that corresponds to a variable
11
and its negation. We connect the head vertex of the earlier clause arc to the tail vertex of
the later clause arc. See the picture below where the dashed arcs are of this type. Finally,
the source s = u1 and the destination is t = wm.
s
1
t1
1
t11
t12
t13
1
t2
1
t21
t22
t23
t
1
t3
1
t31
t32
t33
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Figure 10: Network for formula (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x̄3) ∧ (x̄2 ∨ x3 ∨ x̄4) ∧ (x̄1 ∨ x3 ∨ x4).
The idea is now to let the arcs of a selected (optimal) path correspond with a truth
assignment of the variables in the 3-SAT problem.
Now, the tarification problem has a solution with value 2m if and only if there is a truth
assignment to the variables of the corresponding 3-SAT instance.
Note that the path s = u1, v1, w1, u2, . . . , wm−1, um, vm, wm, with fixed cost arcs has length
2m, and any path taking two tariff arcs in each clause construct has total fixed costs 0.
Moreover, each tariff arc can add at most 1 to the value of the problem, which bounds the
value of any optimal solution to 2m.
First, suppose that an optimal path with value 2m exists. This path will take two arcs
with tariff 1 in each clause construct. Now, let the variables corresponding to the taken
tariff arcs be set to true. Then no conflicts will arise: if both a variable and its negation
are on the path (and thus set to true) in two different clauses, then there is a dashed arc
connecting them. Since this arc is a shortcut of the path (note that we skip at least one
arc with tariff 1 of type (vi, wi)), this contradicts the optimality of the path.
Second, suppose that the 3-SAT problem has a valid truth assignment. Set the tariffs on
the variables in the clauses which are false to a value higher than 2m, and all other tariff
arcs to value 1. Clearly, the dashed arcs are never used in an optimal path, since this
would incorporate an arc with tariff higher than 2m, which is worse for the customer than
the length of the fixed cost path. Finally, none of the arcs with fixed costs 1 will be used,
since the alternative of one of the tariff arcs with tariff one is equally good for the customer
and better for the operator. Thus, the optimal path will take two tariff arcs of value 1 in
each clause construct, which leads to a total value of 2m.
5.2 Approximation
(Roch, Savard, and Marcotte 2005) give also an approximation algorithm for the problem
with one customer, with a performance guarantee of O(log T ). The idea of the algorithm
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is fairly easy. It successively tries to find paths with high tariff revenue. It starts with the
best path P possible: the one with the smallest amount of fixed costs. After computing
the optimal tariffs for P , the tight fixed cost arcs are identified. The one with the smallest
cost replaces the subpath in P it connects. For the new path the procedure is repeated
until all tariff arcs are removed.
A subroutine of this procedure is to find the best tariffs given that the path P is optimal.
Tariff arcs not in P get sufficiently high tariffs, in order not to be a problem. For the arcs
in P a greedy algorithm does the job: in order of appearance in P each arc gets a tariff as
high as possible.
The analysis of the algorithm is the complicated part. The bound is tight for this particular
algorithm, as shown by an example given in (Roch, Savard, and Marcotte 2005).
(Grigoriev et al. 2004) show that in the special case where the inner graph of the SPG
contains only tariff arcs O(logT ) is worst-case even for multiple customers. They also
prove that this problem is APX-hard.
5.3 Polynomially solvable cases
In (Labbé, Marcotte, and Savard 1998) many special cases that are polynomially solvable
have been identified. One of them is the single-customer case, where the order of used
tariff arcs is known. Another is the single tariff-arc problem. (van der Kraaij 2004) proves
that even in the case of fixed charge costs this problem is polynomially solvable. We will
concentrate here on the problem where the number of tariff arcs in not part of the input,
i.e., bounded of fixed beforehand.
The bilevel program defined in (1) is shown to be equivalent to a set of linear programs.
Consider the problem where we force for each client a specific relevant path to be shortest.
Then, as illustrated in the section on Branch-and-bound, the determination of optimal
tariffs, if feasible, is a linear program. Since, in the optimal solution, there is a set of
shortest paths for the clients, we can consider any possible set of shortest paths and solve
the corresponding LP. However, doing this directly does not result in a running time
polynomial in the number of customers. We dig a little deeper in the structure of the
constraints, to get the desired result.
For any client k ∈ K, consider two paths p1, p2 ∈ Pk. If p1 is to be the shortest of the two
paths, the constraint lp1(dk) ≤ lp2(dk) must hold. Thus:
cp1(dk) + πp1(dk) ≤ cp2(dk) + πp2(dk) ⇐⇒ πp1(dk) − πp2(dk) ≤ cp2(dk) − cp1(dk)
This constraint is of the form:
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∑
a∈T1
ta −
∑
a∈T2
ta ≤ b
k(p1, p2) (5)
Here, bk(p1, p2) is a constant and T1 and T2 are disjoint subsets of T . Note that T1 contains
the tariff arcs in p1 not in p2, and T2 contains the tariff arcs in p2 not in p1. The constant
bk(p1, p2) is referred to in the remainder as the switching value for the pair (p1, p2) for a
client k ∈ K. The number of different left-hand sides of 5 is 3|T |, since each variable can
have coefficient only in {−1, 0, 1}. The number of switching-values per client is the number
of different pairs of paths, and that is bounded by (eT !)2.
The main idea is to collect all possible switching values br, and to order them: (r ∈
{1, ..., R}). The next point is that we create our set of LPs as follows. For each disjoint
pair of subsets of T , T1 and T2 we fix a consecutive pair of switching values with the index
r(T1, T2), and we add the following constraint to the LP:
br(T1,T2)−1 ≤
∑
a∈T1
ta −
∑
a∈T2
ta ≤ br(T1,T2) (6)
It is not hard to show that the number of LPs that we can create is polynomial in
the number of clients, but exponential in the number of tariff arcs. For details, see
(van Hoesel et al. 2003).
6 Variants of the Stackelberg pricing problem
6.1 Special cases
The structure of the network can be restricted in the sense that the tariff arcs meet certain
properties. Two obvious properties are: the tariff arcs form a cut-set (Grigoriev et al. 2004),
or the tariff arcs form a path (?). The first problem is not easier than the original problem:
it is still NP-hard, for multiple customers and the best known approximation algorithm
does not improve the one given in the previous section. The second problem is under
recent investigation, with a slight modification: using multiple arcs in common the total
tariff may be smaller than the sum of tariffs of individual arcs. It is not known whether
this problem is NP-hard. Its application is found in toll systems with many entrances and
exits, such as the French highway structure.
6.2 Extensions
Extensions can be defined in several ways. One way is to incorporate capacities on the
arcs. This extension is quite hard to handle. For instance, the path-oriented ideas should
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be replaced with network oriented ideas. No research on this subject has been reported,
as far as known to the author.
A second extension is the pricing mechanism. Instead of linear tariffs, these may be fixed
charge, or even just increasing with demand. The PhD thesis of (van der Kraaij 2004)
contains an analysis of the problem with different types of cost structures. It shows that
the case with one tariff arc is polynomial for the fixed charge costs. Moreover, it shows
how the branch-and-bound algorithm can be used.
A third extension is the incorporation of the design of the network. The following formu-
lation of the tarification problem is a direct translation of the above description. Here, Pk
is the set of paths in the network G = (V, F + T ′) where T ′ is the subset of T of selected
arcs, for which a cost ca is involved. In (Brotcorne et al. 2005) the problem is formulated
and solved with heuristics and a specialized Lagrangean relaxation approach.
6.3 Related problems
In traffic congestion problems time can be considered as a price. Here, however, the
time is dependent on the capacity usage, whereas in our case we have only a linear
relation between capacity usage and price. Examples are routing of traffic flows, see
(Roughgarden and Tardos 2000) and (Roughgarden 2001) and IP traffic engineering, see
(Fortz and Thorup 2000). (Basar and Srikant 2002) treat traffic congestion problems ex-
plicitly as a Stackelberg game on networks.
6.4 General Bilevel Programs
The general linear-linear bilevel program has been shown to be NP-hard by Jeroslow
(Jeroslow 1985). For a reference on bilevel programming, we refer the reader to Vicente
and Calamai (Vicente and Calamai 1994) who have compiled an annotated bibliography
on this subject containing more than one hundred references.
7 Concluding remarks
The standard Stackelberg pricing problem on networks is well-solved from a practical point
of view, and also many important theoretical questions have been answered. Nevertheless,
some interesting open problems remain: approximability for special cases within a con-
stant factor, and cutting plane methods for the integer linear programming formulation
of the problem. Branch-and-cut methods are currently developed by different groups. A
preliminary study can be found in (Dewez 2004).
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For extensions of the problem, many of the results discussed here have no counterpart in
the extensions. For instance, the capacitated case has no good algorithmic methods, and no
results on approximability. This, of course, applies also for other network or combinatorial
bilevel programs. In other words, the field is still rich of open interesting questions.
References
Basar, T., and R. Srikant. 2002. “A Stackelberg network game with a large number of
followers.” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 115 (3): 479–490.
Bouhtou, M., S. van Hoesel, A. F. van der Kraaij, and J.L. Lutton. 2002. “Linear
Tarification in Multi-Commodity Telecommunications Networks.” Meteor Research
Memorandum, vol. RM02012.
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